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Representation in Westminster in the 1990s: 
The Ghost of Edmund Burke 
 
DAVID JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Why are 'trustee' notions of representation still invoked in the UK House of Commons 
in the 1990s? In answering this question this article analyses the premises of Burkean 
theory and the arguments that these premises are of little relevance in the late twentieth 
century. Despite these dismissals of trusteeship, Burkean ideas are still articulated in 
the Commons some 200 years after they were first voiced. The idea of trusteeship can 
prove extremely useful to justify the actions of representatives when those actions 
conflict with constituency 'opinion', party policy or the wishes of interest groups. 
Examples of the occasions when Burkean notions have been invoked in the 1990s are 
provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BURKE: THE PARADOX1 
 
Writing in this journal Philip Cowley pointed to the continuing paradox of 
how Members of Parliament deal with 'conscience issues' in the Commons: 
'[It is] curious that on such important issues the British democratic system 
goes haywire: on almost all other issues, no matter how small, we have a 
system of party democracy. Yet on issues that actually matter to people we 
revert to a system of 659 independent MPs, all allowed to vote with their 
consciences.'2 This paradox becomes even more pronounced in the 
empirical finding that, when MPs are freed from the constraints of the party 
whip on 'conscience' issues, party still remains the most powerful variable 
explaining the votes of individual MPs.3 In fact, Cowley found that party 
cohesion was greater in the 1992-97 parliament on some of these 
supposedly 'non-party' matters than on votes with a three-line whip. 
Implicit within Cowley's analysis is a criticism of the continuing practice of 
allowing free votes on issues of conscience when party considerations still 
appear to influence the outcome in the Commons. As he concludes, 'most 
of the beliefs about conscience issues in the House of Commons are false ... 
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and [hence] the current practice of treating conscience issues as a breed 
apart deserves questioning'.4 
 
Throughout, Cowley's analysis is haunted, implicitly at least, by the 
ghost of Edmund Burke and other 'trustee' theories of representation. The 
fundamental question raised by Cowley's analysis is: why are 'trustee' 
notions of representation still invoked in the 1990s? However, this question 
extends beyond the immediate concern of 'conscience issues' to encompass 
a discussion of the very nature of representative democracy in Britain as we 
head towards the twenty-first century. 
 
EDMUND BURKE AND TRUSTEE THEORY5 
 
Although the essence of trustee theory is remarkably simple - 
representatives should use their independent judgement in reaching 
decisions and should not be bound, therefore, by instructions from their 
electors - the premises upon which this simple conclusion is reached are in 
fact remarkably complex. Burke's position, and that of Whigs more 
generally, revolved around three assumptions: first, representation was to be 
of particular geographical constituencies by particular Members of 
Parliament; second, the purpose of representation was to constitute a 
deliberative body; and, third, parliament was to play a leading role in the 
process of decision making. In essence this was a defence of the 
constitutional settlement of 1689, and of the 'balanced constitution' of 
crown-in-parliament, with parliament in the ascendant and charged with 
'deliberating and pronouncing on the public interest and the common 
good'.6 In occupying this leading role in state policy making, Whigs 
contended that parliament 'should not only give expression to the various 
opinions, interests, and grievances within society, it should also try to 
reconcile them in policies which would serve the best interests of the 
nation'.7 Yet here was the central conundrum of Whig thought, for if 
representation was territorially based and interest-centred, how could it 
simultaneously secure the promotion of a wider national interest through 
consensual state policies? If a representative was locally elected to pursue 
specific territorially linked economic interests, how could he (in an era 
before the female franchise) be expected to articulate and advance the 
national interest? The answer provided by Burke was simple and to the 
point: there was no problem here. To understand his answer, we need to 
analyse Burke's conception of representation serially; to start with the 
relationship between individual constituency and individual representative, 
and then to examine the collective relationship of elected representatives 
within parliament. 
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Constituency-Representative Relationship 
 
Burke's conceptualisation of the proper relationship between constituency 
and representative appears, initially, to be paradoxical. On the one side, the 
representative is expected to pursue the interest of his constituency; yet, on 
the other, once in the confines of Westminster the representative 'is not a 
member of Bristol [a constituency], but he is a member of parliament [the 
nation]'.8 If this is the case then the duty of the representative is to the nation 
as a whole, and as such he 'stands in no special relation to his 
constituency' .9 Yet, for Burke, there is no paradox because the interest of the 
constituency is, ultimately, congruent with that of the nation as a whole. 
 
Individual constituencies were broadly defined in terms of a pre-eminent 
economic interest and their prosperity was correlated closely with the 
promotion of that interest. In effect, this was simply a reflection of 
traditional notions of representation, where members of the Commons were 
returned by small, economically powerful local electorates. In this context 
it made sense to associate specific constituencies with specific interests — 
whether mining, agriculture, trading, shipping, or some other commercial 
interest. Two corollaries stemmed from this conception of constituency 
interest. First, as this interest was objective it was apparent to constituent 
and representative alike. In other words, the representative did not have to 
be told what the interest was, nor did he need to receive instructions as to 
how best to advance that interest. As Pitkin makes clear, constituency 
interest was thus seen to be 'unattached' - 'an objective reality ... apart from 
any individuals it might affect'.10 The second corollary was closely linked to 
the first in that Burke rarely saw 'interest' linked to specific individuals. 
Indeed, he was fundamentally opposed to the representation of 'individuals' 
and their interests, opinions and wishes. Individual opinion, especially when 
aggregated into 'public opinion', was invariably misguided. In which case 
he maintained that only when the opinions of 'the multitude are the standard 
of rectitude, shall I think myself obliged to make those opinions the master 
of my conscience'.11 In the absence of such rectitude, however, Burke was 
willing to inform his own constituents that his duty was to maintain 'your 
interest even against your opinions'.12 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century this was a defensible position for a 
Whig to adopt as it simultaneously protected the existing narrow 
geographical franchise (which effectively excluded rapidly developing 
urban areas from parliamentary representation) as well as challenging 
radical and liberal ideas that 'individuals' should be the basis of 
representation. Despite the significant growth and shifts in population to 
urban areas the representation of counties and boroughs had remained 
largely unchanged. In response, the movement for parliamentary reform 
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began to organise in the 1770s and to demand 'equal representation of the 
whole body of the people',13 annual parliaments and the redistribution of 
parliamentary seats. Yet, for Burke, the fact that many of the new industrial 
cities had no representatives in parliament was not a matter of concern: they 
were represented 'virtually'. In this view, as long as there were 
representatives from other constituencies with similar commercial, 
agricultural or manufacturing interests, the interests of all other localities 
with these same interests could find representation in parliament - even 
though those localities were not directly represented therein. Hence, 
although there was not 'actual' representation there was 'virtual' 
representation. The latter occurred where 'there is a communion of interests, 
and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name 
of any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though 
the trustees are not actually chosen by them'.14 'Such a representation I think 
to be, in many cases, even better than the actual. ... [CJommon interest and 
common sentiment are rarely mistaken'.15 At its simplest, therefore, the 
representative for Bristol, in looking after the interest of Bristol, would also 
be looking after the same economic interest wherever it is located. The logic 
is that 'Birmingham is virtually represented in ... parliament because both it 
and Bristol are of the trading interest. Bristol sees to it that a representative 
of the trading interest is sent to Parliament, and Birmingham thus has its 
spokesman'.16 However, for this logic to prevail two other conditions were 
required: first, that a representative would listen to his own constituents and 
be electorally responsible to them; and, second, that his actions in 
parliament should not be bound or mandated by them. 
 
The first condition is necessary to ensure that representatives continue to 
promote their own constituency interests. Elections are the medium by 
which representatives are kept in tune with constituency interest. But 
elections are a reactive and not a proactive mechanism. Their purpose is not 
to express policy preferences but to assess the efficacy of representation and 
to decide how far a constituency's economic interest has been protected. In 
theory, 'every general election is to the representative a day of judgement, 
in which he appears before his constituents to account for the use of the 
talent with which they intrusted him, and for the improvement he has made 
of it for the public advantage'.17 Again, if interest is objective, and if both 
representative and electorate alike know what it is, then there will be no 
fundamental disagreement between them. In Burke's words: 'Certainly, 
Gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live 
in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved 
communication with his constituents.... It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, 
his pleasure, his satisfactions, to theirs - and above all, ever, and in all cases, 
to prefer their interest to his own'.18 Elections are essential, however, in 
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those cases where representatives start to prefer - whether through 
corruption or incompetence - their own interest to that of their constituents. 
If there is long-term disagreement between constituents and representative 
then there must be something wrong. Ultimately, this is a negative assertion 
on Burke's part of the value of elections, as it holds that 'a lasting 
discrepancy between the member and the people is /«consistent with true 
representation'.19 
 
The second condition is that a representative should neither be bound by 
instructions from his constituents, nor act as their delegate in parliament. In 
part, this was because Burke believed public opinion to be invariably illinformed 
and unstable. In which case, he saw it as his duty as a 
representative 'to give them information, and not receive it from them ... I 
should be ashamed to show my face before them, if I changed my ground 
as they cried up or cried down men or things or opinions - if I wavered and 
shifted about with every change'.20 In part also, it was because Burke 
believed in the superior capacities of a natural aristocracy who 'acted as the 
paternal guardians of the countless communities which together made up 
the kingdom. These men should not slavishly follow the transient whims of 
popular prejudice'.21 Government should thus remain in the hands of this 
aristocracy rather than be placed in the hands of the people. An enlightened 
elite was to exercise power on behalf, not at the behest, of the people. This 
did not mean that the elite was unresponsive to the electorate. Far from it, 
because 'the people are the masters'.22 'But', and it is a significant 'but', 
'[t]hey have only to express their wants at large and in gross. We [MPs] are 
the expert artists; we are the skilful workmen, to shape their desires into 
perfect form, and to fit the utensil to the use'.23 
 
Collective Relationship of Elected Representatives within Parliament 
 
It is at this point that our attention comes to be redirected away from the 
individual relationship between representative and constituency towards the 
collective relationship of elected representatives within parliament. But 
Burke's view of the collective role of parliament is predicated upon his view 
of society as being organic and differentiated with a paternal, aristocratic 
elite acting as the guardians of communities of the realm. In this sense 
Burke was the defender of 'aristocratic trusteeship'.24 Whilst representation 
ensured that political power was to be exercised ultimately in the interest of 
the represented, the represented themselves were, for the reasons outlined 
above, to have little direct influence upon public policy. It is as well at this 
stage to underline, therefore, that Burke's ideas had little in common with 
modern notions of responsible government. Overall, Burke was dismissive 
of the view that individuals should count equally in politics and especially 
contemptuous of notions of popular representation. For him democracy was 
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tyranny: 'The tyranny of the multitude is but a multiplied tyranny.'25 
 
The purpose of representation instead is to allow the 'true natural 
aristocracy' to discover and enact the national interest. An interest, 
moreover, which holds paramount the defence of property against the great 
masses. Thus the role of representatives collectively is to identify the 
national interest. State policy should thus reflect the interest of the whole, 
and, for this reason, representatives in parliament should not be mandated 
or bound by instructions from their constituents. Only through deliberation 
and the consideration of the broad range of constituency interests in the 
House of Commons could consensus be reached upon the national interest. 
The promotion of 'narrow' and 'sectional' interests by constituency 
delegates would not only frustrate this objective but in fact would be 'utterly 
unknown to the laws of this land' and would arise from a fundamental 
misconception 'of the whole order and tenor of our constitution'.26 It is in 
this context that Burke's famous Address to the Electors of Bristol should 
be read: 
 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile 
interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and 
advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a 
deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the 
whole - where not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general 
good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You chose a 
member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member 
of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament.27 
 
All the different communities founded upon various forms of property thus 
have an ultimate interest in the well-being of the whole. The 'national 
interest' is conceived merely as the aggregation of the objective economic 
interests represented in localities. 
 
Only parliament can discover the national interest through the 
articulation of constituency interests in discussion. Armed with this 
information, each and every representative will be able to assess the merits 
of each argument, and in the course of a complex process of deliberation 
will be able to discover the national interest. Hence, the result of 
parliamentary discussion is the rational formulation of the interest of the 
whole and consensus. But this agreement will only emerge if MPs are not 
bound by the opinions of their constituents. Precisely because constituents 
were not present at the discussions in parliament they could not know what 
the national interest is at any given time, and precisely because they do not 
have this knowledge they should give their representatives the freedom to 
act as they see fit to determine and promote the national interest. In which 
case, 'if the local constituent should have an interest or should form an hasty 
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opinion evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the 
member for that place ought to be as far as any other from any endeavour 
to give it effect'.28 
 
Burke's view on representation is thus complex and interweaves various 
ideas about the British constitution, and the political balance pivoted around 
the constitutional settlement of 1689; about the nature of property, and the 
objective nature of economic interest; about society and its organic nature; 
and about the virtues of aristocratic leadership. It is within this context that 
his views about trusteeship have to be analysed. His was not a universal 
claim to 'independence' on the part of representatives. In fact, it was a 
specific claim made in a specific historical period to address specific 
problems occasioned by the rise of political parties and the demands for 
parliamentary reform. The irony, therefore, is that Burke's argument, which 
received little prominence at the time,29 became central to the formulation of 
the issue of democratic representation in later centuries despite its 
antidemocratic premises. 
 
TRUSTEE THEORY AND MODERN NOTIONS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
There are, of course, many commentators and politicians in the 1990s who 
point to the pre-democratic origins of trustee theory and argue that notions 
of 'trusteeship' are of little relevance to the political circumstances of 
modern Britain. They claim that the development of an educated citizenry, 
a mass electorate, political parties and party government have all served to 
undermine Burkean notions of representation. This case is presented most 
starkly in Bealey's judgement that: 'Burke is largely irrelevant, for he lived 
in the era of limited suffrage before there were mass parties.'30 Other 
academics are content simply to stress that 'the heyday of this strongly 
elitist view was in the nineteenth century before the rise of organised 
parties'.31 Likewise, MPs, particularly Labour MPs, have argued that: 'It is 
time Burke was put in his place - Burke was no democrat and since he 
spoke a new world has been born. We do not live in Burke's world 
anymore.'32 Conservative MPs have also been willing to acknowledge the 
anachronistic character of Burke's argument. Speaking in the debate on the 
Criminal Justice Bill in April 1987, Michael McNair-Wilson, Conservative 
MP for Newbury, stated: 
 
I suggest that the comments of an 18th century politician [Burke] are 
not really relevant at the end of the 20th century. He spoke when 
Parliament was of a different stamp, when the populace was largely 
illiterate and uneducated and did not possess television, radio or 
masscirculation newspapers. It could scarcely claim to be informed. That 
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society cannot be compared with our own. We now have a highly 
educated populace that is well informed and articulate. In these times 
those outside the chamber are as well equipped as we are to make a 
decision on their individual safety and the safety of their community.33 
 
Indeed, there are now those who maintain that Burkean principles of 
trusteeship are a threat to the democratic process itself. This fear was 
articulated by Geoff Mulgan, director of the independent think-tank Demos: 
 
Edmund Burke's famous argument [was] that electorates should trust 
MPs to vote with their judgement, not as delegates. The principle was 
crucial to the rise of parliaments in the late 18th and 19th century 
when most "informed opinion" viewed democracy as a road to 
irrational mob rule and tyranny. Yet as the decades passed, and 
popular pressure forced extensions of the franchise, it turned out that 
ordinary people were, after all, wiser than their rulers had feared, and 
generally happy to leave the great decisions to their betters in 
Parliament. 
But as politicians' public esteem has collapsed ... the Burkean 
principle has come unstuck. Trust has been eroded and many have 
come to see politicians as barriers against, rather than tribunes for 
public opinion.34 
 
Yet, despite these dismissals of trusteeship, Burkean ideas are still articulated 
over 200 years after they were first voiced. Indeed, the Edmund Burke Society 
sent every member of the new House of Commons of May 1997 a copy of 
Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol, and at least one MP found that: 'it 
made terrifying reading in terms of the illumination that it offered to the 
Government's programme and our general situation because it was so deeply 
contemporary'.35 Admittedly, however, the occasions upon which Burkean 
notions are advanced are now limited and tend to justify specific instances 
where representatives deem that they have a right to use their individual 
judgement. In other words, no British MP in the 1990s would claim to act 
exclusively as a trustee, beholden only to his or her own conception of the 
national interest. Instead, the reality of modern parliamentary politics is that 
MPs are primarily representatives of their party, increasingly attentive to their 
constituencies, as well as being receptive to the claims of organised interests 
within society.36 In this sense diverse conceptions of representation - party, 
collectivist and interest representation - co-exist and contend with longer 
established Whig and liberal notions. The practice of representation is thus far 
from uni-dimensional.37 
 
The real significance of Burkean ideas about representation is that they 
preceded the dominant conceptions of party and collectivist notions, and 
 20 
 
indeed provided the frame within which later ideas had to be 
accommodated. Yet these later conceptions did not entirely supersede or 
totally replace notions of trusteeship; instead, new ideas were grafted onto 
existing theories to produce a mixture in which no single theory became 
hegemonic. This analytical point is well expressed by Birch when he notes 
that: 'As circumstances changed, so fresh theories were formulated to meet 
them, but it cannot be said that the fresh theories have generally replaced the 
older ones ... the more usual development has been for the fresh theory to 
take its place alongside the older ones as an additional strand in the British 
political tradition.'38 In this respect, 'old theories' still retain a legitimate 
place in the debate about representation. In fact, it is the legitimation 
afforded by such theories to MPs' actions that sustains the intensity of this 
debate. 
 
The simple, but extremely important, point is that modern 
representatives in Britain may draw upon a range of ideas, each legitimate 
in their own terms, to defend or justify their actions. One example of this 
was provided in Nigel Forman's evidence to the Nolan Committee.39 In 
sketching the 'duties and opportunities' of MPs he provided six analytical 
categories of activities: four related in one sense or another to the 
representation of 'interests', a fifth was 'loyalty to their parties in 
Parliament and in the constituency'; but, 'first of all, MPs have a duty to 
their constituents and on certain issues to their consciences as well. One 
thinks, for example, of the classic issue of capital punishment... and I would 
say that all MPs, without exception, recognise that duty and perform it to 
the very best of their ability'. 
 
The fact that different conceptual bases of representation co-exist 
enables MPs at different times to call upon different, seemingly 
contradictory, conceptions of representation. Burkean notions tend to be 
reserved for occasions when MPs find themselves in conflict with the 
premises of other theories - whether of individualistic, party or 'interest' 
representation. The idea of trusteeship can prove extremely useful to justify 
the actions of representatives when those actions conflict with constituency 
'opinion', party policy or the wishes of interest groups. On some issues - 
especially 'conscience' issues - MPs may find themselves in conflict with 
all three simultaneously. 
 
Conscience Issues 
 
As Cowley notes, there are a number of issues which have been treated as 
matters of 'conscience' in modern parliamentary politics. All recent votes in 
the House of Commons on, for example, abortion, capital punishment, 
hunting, seatbelts and the treatment of war criminals have not been the 
subject of the party whip. Similarly, some, but not all, votes on the issues of 
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homosexuality and family law reform have been unwhipped. The outcomes 
of these votes have been of some significance in the daily lives of many 
people in Britain in the 1990s. The most powerful variable in explaining the 
way that individual MPs vote on these issues is 'party'. Cowley and Stuart40 
found, for instance, that on 12 free votes on 'issues of conscience' between 
1979 and 1996, on most occasions the majority of each of the major parties 
voted in opposite lobbies. On only four issues - voluntary euthanasia, war 
crimes, lowering the age of consent for male homosexual acts and 
legalisation of embryo research - was a majority of Labour and 
Conservative MPs to be found in the same lobby. In this respect 
'conscience' issues are not 'non-party' issues. In fact, party cohesion was 
greater in the 1992-97 parliament on some of these supposedly 'non-party' 
matters than on votes with a three-line whip.41 
 
On the basis of these findings Cowley is led to question the continuing 
practice of allowing free votes on issues of conscience when party 
considerations still appear to influence the outcome in the Commons. Yet 
his own findings reveal that there were internal splits, with significant 
minority opinion, within the Conservative Parliamentary Party on five 
issues and within the Parliamentary Labour Party on three other issues. 
These internal divisions reflected wider divisions within the parties beyond 
Westminster and within the electorate at large. Given the uncertainties of 
mobilising support, it is not too surprising to find, therefore, that party 
managers remain willing, on pragmatic grounds, to allow for the invocation 
of Burkean notions of independent judgement. More particularly party 
managers are aware of the advantages in justifying, in terms of established 
representative theory and practice, what can only be called non-democratic 
decisions (where a majority of the electorate are in favour of a particular 
policy but the majority of party MPs are opposed, with capital punishment 
providing the most clear-cut example). Hence, Burkean notions of 
independence retain a pragmatic utility in the legitimation of decisions in 
the 1990s as well as a principled rationale for the taking of electorally 
unpopular decisions. 
 
The issue of capital punishment has provided a particularly visible 
'fault-line' which has highlighted the continuing relevance of Burkean 
notions of representation for MPs. This divide was evident in the debate in 
February 1994 on a proposed amendment to the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Bill which would have reintroduced capital punishment for the 
murder of a police officer. On that occasion, Tony Blair, then Labour 
frontbench spokesman on Home Affairs, strongly defended a trustee 
position: 
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I understand why a majority of my constituents, and perhaps a 
majority of people in the country, will answer yes to the question, 'Do 
you favour the death penalty?' They are angry and outraged at the 
murders and killings in our society. However, I would like ... to reflect 
upon the fact that, in every debate on the subject that I have witnessed, 
the value of the debate has become obvious as it has proceeded and as 
we have moved from general and instantaneous reaction to the 
particular and the considered. Suddenly answers that appeared 
obvious become more complex and conclusions that seemed certain 
are open to doubt. Such a large majority of Members did not vote 
against the restoration of the death penalty on each occasion because 
they were unaware of their constituents' views but because, on 
reflection and after considered debate, they could not support those 
views.... 
I certainly do not believe that my understanding is superior to that 
of my constituents, but ... we are representatives, not delegates, and 
we must act according to our conscience.42 
 
What is of significance in Blair's statement is the emphasis placed upon 
deliberation and the process of rational discourse in parliament. Here is a 
direct echo of the emphasis placed upon deliberation in the theories of 
Burke and J.S. Mill. An even more direct echo of Burke, indeed almost a 
paraphrasing of his 1774 Speech to the Electors of Bristol, is to be found in 
Betty Boothroyd's contribution to the debate on the Criminal Justice Bill in 
April 1987: 
 
My final argument ... is about the democratic process, because it 
brings into conflict individual conscience and what I regard as 
majority opinion. ... Since first being elected to the House, I have 
consistently demonstrated my opposition to judicial killing, although 
in all honesty I cannot say that all my constituents are aware of my 
views. But I take the view - I believe that my constituents share it 
with me - that I am not a mandated delegate, and this is not a 
delegated assembly. I owe respect to the people whom I represent for 
their point of view. I also owe them my judgement in seeking what is 
right and best for the country in its entirety. 
It would not be wrong in itself, but wrong in the interests of the 
nation, to reinstate capital punishment on the basis of public opinion. 
That opinion I must face and convince. If I fail, my views and I can 
be rejected. It would be intolerable if I were to allow public perception 
rather than convincing argument to blow me away from the opinions 
that I hold.43 
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For other representatives, however, the 'democratic process' requires that 
MPs should 'not run too far ahead of public opinion in any matter'.44 For 
supporters of capital punishment the particular danger is that 'Members of 
Parliament risk distancing themselves from the views of people outside. We 
are becoming less representative on this matter'.45 In which case, therefore, 
'The House and we as Members should reflect public opinion ... It has never 
been clear to me why the House continues to ignore such public opinion'.46 
But even in these latter statements the warrant of public opinion is specific 
and not universal. Thus, Rhodes Boyson offered the qualification that 'I do 
not say that we should do everything that they [the people] want, but we 
should listen to them'.47 Similarly, Elizabeth Peacock maintained: 'I do not 
believe that Members of Parliament are delegates because we are not... the 
measure is a matter of conscience.'48 
 
The linkage between electors and elected is thus contingent rather than 
absolute. Burkean trusteeship confers upon the representative the discretion 
to choose when to heed the opinions of their constituents and when not. 
MPs do not dispute that they should be responsive to their party supporters 
and leaders and to their wider electorates; but the exact degree of 
responsiveness is balanced by a fine calculation of competing imperatives - 
party, constituency, group interest, personal morality or conviction. The 
very contingency of decision leads to inconsistency in the claim made on 
behalf of 'independence' - even by the same MP. This inconsistency was 
encapsulated in the exchange between Jack Straw (Secretary of State for the 
Home Department) and Andrew Robathan (Conservative MP for Blaby) 
during the second reading of the Firearms (Amendment) Bill in June 1997. 
This bill sought to effect the Labour party's manifesto commitment for a 
complete ban on all handguns: 
 
Mr Jack Straw: I strongly commend the Bill's proposals to the 
House, but I want to make it crystal clear that - as in opposition - it 
will be a matter for my hon. Friends' individual consciences to decide 
whether to support or oppose the measure tonight. But none of us 
should doubt the overwhelming public support for the proposed ban. 
For only one indication of the extent of public support for a complete 
handgun ban, I draw the attention of the House to the results of an 
opinion poll in The Daily Telegraph last Friday, which showed that 83 
per cent of those polled approved of the Government's proposed ban 
on all handguns. 
Mr Andrew Robathan (Blaby): The opinion poll may or may not be 
correct, but on that logic, the Home Secretary would be introducing a 
Bill to reinstate capital punishment. Every time there is a poll on that 
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subject, 75 per cent, of people are in favour. That is not a good 
argument for the Bill. 
Mr Straw: I do not accept the premise of the hon. Gentleman's 
argument. Of course, it is in the end a matter for the individual 
consciences of hon. Members, but in making our decisions, we must 
take account of the strength of public feeling. I do not think that 
anything like 83 per cent, of people are in favour of capital 
punishment, but I am well aware that I may not have had my 
constituents' support when I have marched into the Lobby against it. 
That is a fact that I have to take into account, but it does not stop me.49 
 
The extent to which notions of 'independence' and 'conscience' had 
become embedded in the discussion of the issue of capital punishment in the 
House of Commons in the 1990s is revealed in the debate surrounding the 
Human Rights Bill of 1997/98. The bill gives effect in UK domestic law to 
the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Protocol 6 of the ECHR requires the complete abolition of the death penalty 
other than in time of war or imminent threat of war. In introducing the 
Human Rights Bill the UK government sought a reservation on enacting 
Protocol 6. It did so on the grounds that although 
 
there might appear to be little difficulty in our ratifying Protocol 6. 
This would, however, make it impossible for a United Kingdom 
Parliament to re-introduce the death penalty for murder, short of 
denouncing the European Convention. The view taken so far is that 
the issue is not one of basic constitutional principle but is a matter of 
judgement and conscience to be decided by Members of Parliament as 
they see fit. For these reasons, we do not propose to ratify Protocol 6 
at present.50 
 
At the Common's committee stage of the bill, Kevin McNamara introduced 
Amendment 111, which sought (successfully) to overturn this reservation, 
and to insert the sixth protocol into the bill. Opponents of the amendment 
expressed some difficulty in following the logic behind Mr McNamara's 
argument: 
 
At the outset he [Mr McNamara] said, properly, that the issue of 
capital punishment is one for conscience and a free vote, and at any 
time it chooses the House can debate that issue as it relates to 
individual instances - whether it be treason or piracy or whether the 
death penalty should apply in wartime - but would not the effect of 
what he proposes be to fetter the ability of Parliament to express its 
conscience? If we accept the protocol as the hon. Gentleman seeks to 
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admit it, it would no longer be open to Parliament to debate that issue 
without, effectively, throwing out the whole European convention, 
lock, stock and barrel, or at least changing it. Acceptance of the 
protocol would introduce an extra hurdle, which fetters Parliament's 
ability to express its conscience on a matter which, I am sure that he 
will agree, is of widespread public importance, and often discussed.51 
 
The same view was expressed by James Clappison (MP for Hertsmere): 
 
It is right and appropriate that these matters should be decided, now 
and in the future, by the individual judgments and conscience of 
Members of the House on a free vote. The Minister was not giving 
away inside information that would bankrupt anyone in the 
bookmaking profession when he said that it was unlikely in the 
present Parliament that there would be a majority in favour of the 
return of the death penalty. That is true, given the present composition 
of the House.52 
 
While supporters of Amendment 111 were willing to accept that the issue of 
capital punishment 'has to be determined by Members of Parliament after 
rigorous examination of their consciences',53 they maintained, nonetheless, 
that the decision on Protocol 6 was equally a matter of individual 
conscience. In reply, Mike O'Brien, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the 
Home Office, voiced the concern that: 
 
My personal view and that of the Home Secretary is that Parliament 
should be free to decide on death penalty matters on a free vote and 
that protocol 6 would make a free vote difficult. Ratification of the 
protocol, from which no derogation or reservation is permitted, would 
interfere with the ability of a United Kingdom Parliament to consider 
the issue in future, short of effectively denouncing the convention.54 
 
Mr O'Brien made it clear, however, that his was indeed a personal view, and 
that 'as far as the Government are concerned, this is a free vote ... This [the 
vote on Amendment 111 ] is a matter of conscience for hon. Members',55 In 
the vote 294 members used their 'consciences' to support the amendment, 
while 136 followed Mr O'Brien into the 'no' lobby. Once again, the ghost 
of Burke stalked the lobbies of Westminster. 
 
TRUSTEE v. PARTY DELEGATE 
 
Despite affirmations that MPs are not delegates, there is one specific sense 
in which they consistently act as delegates and that is in relation to their 
party. Although the theory of 'party representation' - and its corollaries of 
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the electoral mandate and party cohesion within parliament - is essentially 
the preserve of the Labour Party, the practice of collectivist representation 
extends to all parliamentary parties. The impact of party, even on nominally 
'non-party' issues of conscience, was noted above; but the strength of party 
in influencing MPs' actions in parliament is indicated more powerfully in 
the findings of a survey, conducted by the Study of Parliament Group,56 of 
newly elected MPs in 1992. Of 79 respondents (61.4 per cent of all 127 new 
members) well over four-fifths maintained that their voting decisions and 
parliamentary actions would 'usually', or 'nearly always', be 'strongly 
influenced' by their party leadership. Ninety-six per cent of Labour 
respondents believed this to be the case, as indeed did 84 per cent of new 
Conservative respondents. 
 
What is equally notable, however, is that 71 per cent of Labour 
respondents and 85 per cent of Conservatives in the 1992 sample also said 
that their 'personal opinions' would be expected to influence their 
parliamentary actions and voting decisions. In 1997, 85 of 114 newly 
elected MPs (75 per cent) who responded to the Study of Parliament 
Group's survey still subscribed to the view that MPs should exercise their 
independence. In other words, party theory coexists with trustee theories in 
the minds of newly elected MPs. There is, therefore, a potential for these 
divergent notions to come into conflict. When they do, either theory may be 
invoked to legitimate, or challenge, the actions of MPs. A clear illustration 
of this clash was provided in the battle over intra-party democracy within 
the Labour Party in the early 1980s. Supporters of the party theory of 
representation chose to criticise the Parliamentary Labour Party because: 
 
Most Labour MPs appear to have the same conception of their role as 
do Tory and Liberal MPs. They see themselves as representatives very 
much as defined by Burke: they claim the right to exercise their 
individual judgement, and on that basis to treat the Party's Election 
Manifesto and Programme as little more than advisory.57 
 
What was needed, from this perspective, was to make MPs and the 
parliamentary leader more accountable to the wider labour movement. Not 
surprisingly, the reforms effected in 1980 and 1981 - the introduction of the 
mandatory reselection of Labour MPs, and the establishment of an electoral 
college for the selection of the party leader - sought to ensure just that. One 
consequence of adopting these constitutional changes was that the inherent 
tension between conceptions of parliamentary representation within the 
party was heightened, with three of the most vociferous opponents of the 
internal reforms - David Owen, Shirley Williams and William Rodgers - 
voicing their objections to the proposed changes in Burkean terms: 
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For decades debates on policy and organisation have gone on within 
our party, and we have managed to find some way of working 
together. But this time the far left wants no compromise. It is seeking 
not only to dominate the party, but to destroy representative 
democracy itself. MPs are chosen by their constituents to exercise 
their conscience and judgement. MPs ... who are nothing but 
mandated party delegates cannot be representatives of their 
constituencies in the true sense. They cease to be accountable to the 
people who elected them and become instead the rubber stamps for a 
party caucus, one that does not even include the majority of party 
members.58 
 
So great was the fear that Labour MPs would be expected to act as delegates 
of their constituency party activists that 28 Labour MPs chose at the time to 
leave the party to join the Social Democratic Party. Even those MPs who 
were willing to remain within the Labour Party expressed their concern at 
the possibility of being subject to the diktat of constituency activists 
'instructing elected representatives how to behave, regardless of their 
electors' views'.59 
 
However, invocation of Burke is not exclusively the preserve of 
embattled Labour MPs, as Conservative and Liberal Democratic MPs are 
just as likely to call upon trustee conceptions of representation when in 
conflict with their constituency parties, or in disagreement with party policy. 
Thus, for example, David Alton MP announced, in September 1992, that he 
would not stand as a Liberal Democrat parliamentary candidate at the next 
election in protest at the decision taken at the party's conference to make 
abortion a policy issue rather than a matter to be decided by individual 
conscience.60 More dramatically, in the Conservative Party in the aftermath 
of Mrs Thatcher's resignation as party leader in 1990, eight constituency 
associations organised meetings to consider the deselection of their MPs — 
most notably Julian Critchley, Michael Mates and Ivor Stanbrook - who had 
actively sought Mrs Thatcher's replacement as party leader. On this 
occasion, the leader-writer of The Independent counselled Conservative 
activists to remember that: 
 
Members of Parliament are not delegates who can have their mandate 
withdrawn at the whim of local party activists. The Conservative 
Central Office guidance manual for intending parliamentary 
candidates specifically states that Tory MPs once elected, should be 
free to exercise their own judgement within the very wide ambit of 
Conservative principles.61 
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George Gardiner, Conservative MP for Reigate, felt the need to remind his 
local party of this freedom in his battle against de-selection before the 
general election of 1997. His constituency association sought his deselection 
on the grounds of repeated 'disloyalty to the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet'. Gardiner's response was to invoke Burke: 'An MP is not a 
sheep. He must follow his own convictions',62 and, more explicitly: 'Reigate 
Conservatives will have to decide whether a Member of Parliament is sent 
to Westminster purely as lobby fodder, or whether he should exercise his 
own judgement on matters of supreme national importance.'63 
 
Conservative MPs and Europe 
 
Throughout the 1990s most Conservative MPs identified the issue of 
European integration to be of 'supreme national importance'.64 In these 
circumstances, the certainties of intra-party support and cohesion gave way 
to a contingent relationship between vertical groupings of opinion within 
the governing party. Not surprisingly, Burke was cited in defence of the 
necessary 'independence' asserted by one faction in face of the other. The 
malleability of 'trusteeship' and its contemporary relevance can be gauged 
from its deployment by those both in support of, and in opposition to, the 
Conservative leadership's European stance at any given moment. The 
respective claims revolved around who could best decipher the 'best 
interests of the electorate'. Both sides agreed, however, that it was not the 
electorate itself. Thus, those opposed to allowing the electorate to vote in a 
referendum on the question of a European single currency maintained that 
Burke was on their side: 
 
All of us who have been in the House for a long time have taken 
difficult decisions on many issues. Those include moral issues, such 
as capital punishment and changes in the abortion laws, and 
constitutional issues such as the treaty of Maastricht, the Single 
European Act 1986 and, before I came here, the treaty of Rome. I 
agree strongly with Burke, who when speaking to the electorate of 
Bristol said: "Your representative owes you not his industry only, but 
his judgment. And he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices 
it to your opinion". That is not a popular view ... If the House is to 
retain respect, we must have the courage at times to follow our own 
judgment and, having listened carefully, not to be swayed from that.65 
 
In the same debate, Sir Terrence Higgins upheld the view that MPs 'come 
to the House as representatives, not delegates': 
 
We are not here to function as a surrogate calculating machine, to vote 
the way that our constituents would if they could all press a button. 
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We have a much greater responsibility to consult our constituents and 
listen to their arguments, but it is the strength of the argument and not 
the number of people who make it that is important. Then, we must 
weigh up the arguments and vote as our constituents would if they had 
the advantage that we do of listening to debates and analysing the 
issues.66 
 
If Burke could be invoked against following the leadership's position on a 
referendum on a single currency then, equally, his words could be used to 
rally support for a beleaguered leadership. Thus, in December 1995, 
Edward Heath counselled his Conservative backbench colleagues not to 
defeat the government on a motion on EU fisheries policy. In a neat 
illustration of the elision between the 'interests of the country' and the 
'interests of the government' he advised colleagues 'who represent the 
fishing industry': 
 
Of course my hon. Friends must take notice of the fishermen in their 
constituencies, but I also remind them of the remark by Burke so 
many centuries ago that is often repeated in the House. The purpose 
and responsibility of a representative is to look after the interests of 
his constituents, but he must also consider the interests of the country 
and the community. That is the basis of our work here. 
Every hon. Member owes his constituents not only his energy 'but 
his judgment'. Those were Burke's words. We can offer our fishermen 
our energy, but my hon. Friends have to make a judgment tonight as 
to whether it is an event and a matter that justifies their defeating the 
Government. That is the crucial question to be answered.67 
 
In the event the government was defeated by 299 votes to 297 with two 
Conservative MPs voting against the government and 11 others deliberately 
abstaining. Edward Heath's plea for Conservative MPs to use 'their 
judgement' in favour of the government and party loyalty was counterposed 
by the use of 'independent judgement' to assert the views of a broader 
conception of the 'interests of the country' beyond partisan considerations. 
On this occasion Burke and 'trusteeship' prevailed against party and 
'delegate' notions of representation. That it did so to no policy effect, other 
than the Agriculture Minister's pronouncement that due weight would be 
given to the decision by the House at the next day's European Fisheries 
Council, did not detract from the fact that MPs were able to legitimate their 
'independence' in face of collectivist notions of 'party representation'. 
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NOLAN, INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND TRUSTEESHIP 
 
The continuing strength of trustee notions of representation is also evident 
in recent concern about 'sleaze' in Westminster. Underpinning the remedial 
measures taken by the Commons since 1995 there has been a fundamental 
perception that the legitimacy of parliamentary representation was being 
eroded by modern practices of interest advocacy. In turn, this perception 
stemmed from a conception of representation rooted in 'trustee' notions of 
independence and the belief that MPs represented the nation generally and 
their constituencies specifically. In the words of Peter Shore: 'The country 
has a gut feeling that Members of Parliament are here above all to serve 
them and the nation, and that anything that interferes with that must be 
justified rather than taken for granted.'68 This belief shone through the 
successive resolutions of the House, the Nolan report, and the Code of 
Conduct adopted by the House in July 1996. The grip of Burkean theory not 
only within the House but upon academic observers is revealed in Dawn 
Oliver's statement that 'standards of conduct required of British MPs rest on 
a number of often unspoken assumptions which reflect the underlying 
theory of representative democracy ... The established basic theory of 
representation in the UK is that expressed by Edmund Burke in his Letter to 
the Electors of Bristol in 1774'.69 As Oliver proceeded to note: 'In sum the 
objections to the various activities [including advocacy of a cause in 
parliament for payment] were that they affected the exercise by MPs of their 
judgement in various ways that were contrary to the Burkean theory of 
representation.'70 
 
Indeed, the starting point for Nolan's recommendations was the 1947 
resolution of the House and, by implication, a reaffirmation of 'trustee' 
notions of representation. The 1947 resolution prohibited any restrictions on 
the freedom of MPs to act and speak as they wish, or which caused them to 
act as representatives of outside bodies.71 The Nolan Committee 
recommended a restatement of this resolution,72 and, in November 1995, the 
House amended the 1947 resolution. Whereas Nolan had proposed only a 
limited ban on MPs entering into agreements with multi-client 
consultancies, the amended resolution adopted by the House in November 
1995 specifically prohibited paid advocacy for any cause. Despite the 
reservations of some MPs about the practicalities of drawing a distinction 
between advice and advocacy, the House agreed to bring greater 
transparency to the former and to ban the latter. The House also agreed to 
accept Nolan's recommendations on a Code of Conduct for MPs, the 
appointment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, the creation 
of a new Select Committee on Standards and Privileges (to replace the 
existing Committees on Privileges and Members' Interests), and for the 
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disclosure of income derived from services offered by MPs as 
parliamentarians. The Code of Conduct is notable in that it seeks to 'provide 
a framework within which acceptable conduct should be judged'.73 It is also 
notable for our purposes because at the heart of that framework is the 
Burkean belief that 'Members have a general duty to act in the interests of 
the nation as a whole; and a special duty to their constituents' and that to 
perform this duty members must have 'complete independence in 
Parliament'.74 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Burkean notions of the exercise of 'enlightened conscience' on the part of 
representatives are invariably dismissed as anachronistic in the 1990s. For 
some Burke is simply 'a voice from a distant past' unsuited to the age of 
modern party politics,75 for others, however, the continued invocation of 
Burke is more perplexing because, 'despite some 200 years of democratic 
advance, we appear to be content to let some of the most sensitive and 
important matters in society be determined in accordance with the political 
orthodoxy of the 18th century'.76 That this remains so is a reflection of the 
fact that the 'orthodoxy' of trusteeship has never been fully superseded by 
other later conceptions of representation. In turn, this reflects the fact that 
'trusteeship' encapsulates the basic principles of representation: consent, 
authorisation, accountability and responsibility. Representatives in 
parliament are able to inform themselves of the changing balance of opinion 
in the country and to shape public policy accordingly. In using their 
'enlightened conscience' or their 'full freedom to act in their own 
judgements', MPs do so on the understanding that their constituents expect 
them to promote both constituency interests and the long-term interests of 
society as a whole. By this view, only the collective deliberation of all 
representatives in parliament will produce these objectives. Through the 
process of deliberation, representatives not only shape but also legitimise 
public policy. Moreover, any lasting discrepancy between MPs and their 
constituents would reveal a pathological condition to be rectified through 
the ballot box. 
 
In this respect, 'trustee' notions provided the frame within which later 
collectivist ideas of representation developed. Given the potency of trustee 
theories in the legitimation of public policy, in that legislative outputs were 
deemed to be legitimate precisely because they had been subject to the 
process of deliberation by representatives of all sections of the 'political 
nation' (however defined at the time), collectivist theories could not in 
themselves displace these notions. Instead, they have coexisted - often 
uneasily - with the continuing belief that 'Our MPs are representatives of 
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the people, not delegates. We expect them to exercise their own judgement, 
not simply to reflect ours'.77 What is noteworthy about this statement is that 
it was made at the end of the twentieth century, not at the end of the 
eighteenth century. The ghost of Burke continues to haunt British 
parliamentary politics! 
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